Children's apparently inconsistent answers about the earth's shape are largely explained by consistent use of alternative mental models¶

Claim · All claims
Evidence · 1 study · qualitative r? · q2 · n=first-, third- and fifth-grade children (number not stated in the abstract)
Currency · newest study 1992 · not yet checked against its sources · not reviewed by a person

The founding study of the coherent-model, or framework-theory, view of misconceptions, which the knowledge-in-pieces view contests.

Subclaims¶

q2 i? Many children said the earth is round but also that it has an edge people could fall off; much of this apparent inconsistency was explained by assuming the children used, consistently, a mental model other than the sphere (rectangular, disc, dual earth, hollow sphere, flattened sphere). → Vosniadou 1992

q2 i? The authors argue the models are constrained by presuppositions drawn from everyday experience: flat models come first, and synthetic models (hollow and flattened sphere) reconcile a flat initial model with the taught spherical one, so the spherical model is understood only once those presuppositions are reinterpreted. → Vosniadou 1992

Evidence¶

Vosniadou 1992¶

Vosniadou, S., & Brewer, W. F. (1992). Mental models of the earth: A study of conceptual change in childhood. Cognitive Psychology, 24(4), 535–585. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(92)90018-W

q2 · cross-sectional interview study · i? · no effect size reported in the abstract · n=first-, third- and fifth-grade children (number not stated in the abstract) · qualitative · r?

Elementary school children in three grades answered a series of questions about the shape of the earth. Their answers looked inconsistent until they were read as the consistent use of one of five alternative mental models. The account of presuppositions, initial and synthetic models is the authors' interpretation of that pattern. Coded from the published abstract; the full text was not read.

Discussion¶

The study is the standard citation for the view that children's misconceptions are coherent, theory-like models. The knowledge-in-pieces view reads the same kind of inconsistency as evidence that children draw on many context-cued knowledge elements; this claim's single study does not test between the two readings. For a designer the two readings point to different probes: a coherent-model reading justifies diagnosing which model a learner holds; a knowledge-in-pieces reading suggests asking the same question in several contexts before concluding that a learner holds any model.

Related Claims¶

• Student misconceptions can be read as knowledge elements that serve in some contexts and are refined and reorganised during learning, rather than as strongly held flawed ideas that instruction must confront and replace — the contrasting knowledge-in-pieces view
• Boys and girls do not differ in the type of mental models of the day and night cycle they hold — related