Joint attention is a group phenomenon not reducible to either individual's mental representations¶

Claim · All claims
Evidence · 1 study · theoretical r2 · q1
Currency · newest study 2014 · not yet checked against its sources · not reviewed by a person

Subclaims¶

q1 i? Joint attention involves both members of a dyad gazing with the same intent, and its mutuality is not reducible to either individual's mental representations. → Gerry Stahl 2014

Evidence¶

Gerry Stahl 2014¶

Gerry Stahl, Nancy Law, Ulrike Cress & Sten Ludvigsen. (2014). Analyzing roles of individuals in small-group collaboration processes. International Journal of Computer-Supported Collaborative Learning, 9, 365–370. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11412-014-9204-9

q1 · i? · theoretical · r2

This is the editorial's theoretical argument, drawing on Tomasello's comparative research and Vygotsky's analysis of the pointing gesture, about the Schneider and Pea gaze study: joint attention is "a group phenomenon" involving gazing with the same intent and mutual knowledge of gazing together.

"The mutuality of intersubjective intentionality is not reducible to either individual 's mental representations, but consists in a shared meaning making."

Discussion¶

Related Claims¶

• Multi-modal representations created during collaboration act as metaphors that shape joint reasoning and meaning making — related
• Proactive feedback produces significant post-intervention increases in Joint Visual Attention of dyads — related
• Adaptive AI support directs regulatory activity toward monitoring while static AI support produces strategy-focused, procedural regulation — related
• Collaboration quality relates to the ratio of group to individual activity in gaze-supported dyads — related
• Joint visual attention correlates with collaboration quality, but unbalanced visual participation is negatively correlated with learning gains — related