Individual and task factors fail to predict resolution, while perceived consequences predict calibration in opposite directions for phishing and legitimate emails¶
Claim · All claims
Evidence · 1 study (2 entries) · associationalr2·q3
Currency · newest study 2019 · not yet checked against its sources · not reviewed by a person
Subclaims¶
Reading the evidence codes
q is the design tier, i the impact, n the sample, and the kind with its r
the rigour judged within that kind: what each code means.
This claim: no standardized effect is recorded in observations/ for it yet, so no benchmark reading is possible.
q3 i? None of the individual or task predictors were significantly related to resolution (p > .01). → Casey Inez Canfield & Baruch Fischhoff & Alex Davis 2019
q3 i? Participants who perceived greater negative consequences of falling for phishing were less well calibrated for legitimate emails but better calibrated for phishing emails. → Casey Inez Canfield & Baruch Fischhoff & Alex Davis 2019 (2)
Evidence¶
Casey Inez Canfield & Baruch Fischhoff & Alex Davis 2019¶
Casey Inez Canfield & Baruch Fischhoff & Alex Davis. (2019). Better beware: comparing metacognition for phishing and legitimate emails. Metacognition and Learning. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11409-019-09197-5
q3 · i? · causal · r2
Linear regressions (Table 2) combining both experiments (N = 231) predicting calibration and resolution from attention, training time, time per email, perceived consequences, age, gender, and education. The article calls this inconsistent with earlier research finding better calibration with more time per email.
"None of the predictors were significantly related to resolution ( p >. 0 1 )."
Casey Inez Canfield & Baruch Fischhoff & Alex Davis 2019 (2)¶
Casey Inez Canfield & Baruch Fischhoff & Alex Davis. (2019). Better beware: comparing metacognition for phishing and legitimate emails. Metacognition and Learning. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11409-019-09197-5
q3 · i? · associational · r2
The strongest effect in the Table 2 regressions, for perceived consequences on calibration for both email types. The article attributes it to a bias toward perceiving emails as phishing, improving phishing accuracy while reducing legitimate accuracy.
"For legitimate emails, participants who thought that falling for phishing attacks had greater (negative) consequences were less well calibrated (i.e. calibration was further from 0). In contrast, for phishing attacks, they were better calibrated."
Discussion¶
Related Claims¶
- Calibration is worse and resolution better for phishing emails than for legitimate emails — related
- Email-detection confidence judgments show good calibration but poor resolution, with aggregate overconfidence of 18% — related
- Better resolution on the laboratory phishing task predicts lower odds of malicious files on participants' home computers — related
- Participants are consistently overconfident for phishing emails but relatively well calibrated for legitimate emails except at 100% confidence — related
- Big Five personality factors show few consistent effects on metacognitive judgments in domain-specific tests — related
Page metadata
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
type |
claim |
id |
predictors-of-metacognition-null-resolution-consequences-calibration |
title |
Individual and task factors fail to predict resolution, while perceived consequences predict calibration in opposite directions for phishing and legitimate emails |
description |
Individual and task factors fail to predict resolution, while perceived consequences predict calibration in opposite directions for phishing and legitimate emails |
status |
review |
evidence_strength |
mixed |
newest_evidence |
2019 |
generated |
by process:wiki-ingest on 2026-10-18 |
trust |
unverified — no one has confirmed this page's content |
sources |
2 — casey-inez-canfield-baruch-fischhoff-alex-davis-2019, casey-inez-canfield-baruch-fischhoff-alex-davis-2019-2 |
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