Participants seek AI advice less frequently when accuracy carries monetary stakes¶
Claim · All claims
Evidence · 1 study (2 entries) · causalr2–r3·q3
Currency · newest study 2026 · not yet checked against its sources · not reviewed by a person
Subclaims¶
Reading the evidence codes
q is the design tier, i the impact, n the sample, and the kind with its r
the rigour judged within that kind: what each code means.
This claim: no standardized effect is recorded in observations/ for it yet, so no benchmark reading is possible.
q3 i? In Study 2, participants sought AI advice less often with stakes than without (4.93 vs. 5.44 times out of six questions). → Chiara Marcoccia 2026
q3 i? Study 3 replicated the reduction with salient per-question incentives (4.53 vs. 5.27 times out of six). → Chiara Marcoccia 2026 (2)
Evidence¶
Chiara Marcoccia 2026¶
Chiara Marcoccia, Walter Quattrociocchi, Valerio Capraro. (2026). AI advice suppresses people's willingness to say "I don't know", even when the advice is wrong and accuracy is incentivized. https://osf.io/nwx6r/overview?view_only=a03ae0ca587c4c84a442c44d55ab97b6 doi:10.31234/osf.io/5y6m4_v1
q3 · i? · causal · r2
Study 2 exploratory behavioral measure of AI-advice requests; the article offers this change as "a plausible explanation for why incentives improved accuracy without restoring judgment suspension". No effect size printed.
"participants sought AI advice less frequently when monetary stakes were present than when they were absent (4.93 vs. 5.44 times out of six questions; b = -0.503, SE = 0.160, t = -3.147, p = .002; see Figure 2d)"
Chiara Marcoccia 2026 (2)¶
Chiara Marcoccia, Walter Quattrociocchi, Valerio Capraro. (2026). AI advice suppresses people's willingness to say "I don't know", even when the advice is wrong and accuracy is incentivized. https://osf.io/nwx6r/overview?view_only=a03ae0ca587c4c84a442c44d55ab97b6
q3 · i? · causal · r3
Study 3 replication of the advice-seeking reduction with incentives reminded before every question. No effect size printed.
"Participants sought AI advice substantially less frequently when stakes were present than when they were absent (4.53 vs. 5.27 times out of six questions; b = -0.744, SE = 0.182, t = -4.083, p < .001; see Figure 3c)"
Discussion¶
Related Claims¶
- Access to AI advice roughly doubled reported confidence in answers in one experiment — related
- Merely having access to AI advice nearly eliminates people's willingness to suspend judgment under uncertainty, even when the advice is wrong — related
- Monetary incentives for accuracy improve answer correctness specifically when AI advice is available, by reducing reliance on that advice — related
- Monetary stakes for accuracy act independently of AI availability on judgment suspension, with no significant AI × stakes interaction — related
- AI assistance can inflate confidence even after errors and reduce accuracy when AI is faulty (cognitive surrender) — related
- Participants seek help less often than they withhold answers when both strategies are available or compared across conditions — related
- Help seeking is guided by a wider variety of considerations beyond improving immediate answer accuracy than withholding answers is — related
Page metadata
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
type |
claim |
id |
stakes-reduce-ai-advice-seeking |
title |
Participants seek AI advice less frequently when accuracy carries monetary stakes |
description |
Participants seek AI advice less frequently when accuracy carries monetary stakes |
status |
review |
evidence_strength |
moderate |
newest_evidence |
2026 |
generated |
by process:wiki-ingest on 2026-10-10 |
trust |
unverified — no one has confirmed this page's content |
sources |
2 — chiara-marcoccia-2026, chiara-marcoccia-2026-2 |
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