A numerical example explores subsidizing low-income students' costly demonstrated interest to reduce admission inequity¶

Claim · All claims
Evidence · 1 study · associational r2 · q1
Currency · newest study 2017 · not yet checked against its sources · not reviewed by a person

Subclaims¶

q1 i? A numerical example examines subsidization of costly demonstrated interest by low-income students as a policy to reduce inequity. → James A. Dearden 2017

Evidence¶

James A. Dearden 2017¶

James A. Dearden, Suhui Li, Chad D. Meyerhoefer, Muzhe Yang. (2017). Demonstrated Interest: Signaling Behavior in College Admissions. Contemporary Economic Policy, vol. 35, issue 4. https://www.mathematica.org/publications/demonstrated-interest-signaling-behavior-in-college-admissions doi:10.1111/coep.12216

q1 · i? · associational · r2

A numerical (simulation-style) example, not a human experiment; the authors use it "to explore policies to reduce the inequity associated with the use of demonstrated interest," focusing on subsidizing low-income students' costly contacts. No policy effect sizes are printed in the available text.

"We also use a numerical example to explore policies to reduce the inequity associated with the use of demonstrated interest in admission decisions, examining in particular the subsidization of costly demonstrated interest by low-income students"

Discussion¶

Related Claims¶

• The admission-probability effect of contact is increasing in applicant SAT score, particularly when contact is costly — related
• Applicants who contact a selective university's admissions office are more likely to be admitted — a broader claim this one bears on