Expand students' repertoire of epistemic actions and teach when each evidence type is appropriate rather than replacing purportedly poor beliefs¶

Strategy · All strategies
Evidence · 1 claim (1 for) · 1 study (1 review), q2 · 0 of 1 report an effect size · 1 claim rests on one study

Description¶

The article proposes that epistemic-cognition instruction should not simply replace purportedly undesirable beliefs with more sophisticated ones. Instead, "it would be better to (a) expand the repertoire of epistemic actions available to a student and (b) develop in the student an appreciation both the limitations of different types of epistemic actions as well as situations in which they are useful and appropriate to invoke." This reframes empirical and authoritarian evidence as sometimes appropriate for certain epistemic aims rather than always unproductive.

Design Implications¶

Context¶

Requirements¶

• Instruction must present multiple types of evidence and their limitations rather than suppressing empirical and authoritarian reasoning outright

Constraints¶

• The article presents this as a recommendation arising from its arguments and calls for further research to determine if such recommendations are viable

Target Learners¶

• K-12 and university mathematics students

Target Learning Goals¶

• epistemic cognition in mathematics
• evaluating mathematical arguments
• selecting appropriate evidence for an epistemic aim

Affordances¶

• Epistemic Aims Mathematical Conviction

Claims¶

• Students from middle school through university frequently offer empirical justifications on proof tasks, though empirical arguments become rare among advanced mathematics majors [+W]

Related Strategies¶

Examples¶

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Key Sources¶

• Keith Weber, Matthew Inglis & Juan Pablo Mejia-Ramos. (2013). How mathematicians obtain conviction: Implications for mathematics instruction and research on epistemic cognition. https://doi.org/10.1080/00461520.2013.865527