Claims

Commitment devices such as deadlines show demand but mixed effectiveness for student performance

Claim · All claims
Evidence · 1 study · review r2 · q2
Currency · newest study 2015 · not yet checked against its sources · not reviewed by a person

Subclaims

Reading the evidence codes

q is the design tier, i the impact, n the sample, and the kind with its r the rigour judged within that kind: what each code means.

This claim: no standardized effect is recorded in observations/ for it yet, so no benchmark reading is possible.

q2 i? Students demand commitment devices, but exogenously set deadlines do not always improve task completion or performance. → Alexander Koch 2015

Evidence

Alexander Koch 2015

Alexander Koch, Julia Nafziger, Helena Skyt Nielsen. (2015). Behavioral economics of education. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 115 (2015) 3–17. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.005

q2 · i? · review · r2

The review's synthesis of deadline experiments: Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) found self-imposed deadlines helped but 'performance is worse compared with the treatment where students are given evenly spread deadlines', while Burger et al. (2011) and Bisin and Hyndman (2014) found no improvement in completion rates.

"While there seems to be a clear demand for such devices, they do not always improve performance."

Discussion

Page metadata
Field Value
type claim
id commitment-devices-mixed-effectiveness-education
title Commitment devices such as deadlines show demand but mixed effectiveness for student performance
description Commitment devices such as deadlines show demand but mixed effectiveness for student performance
status review
evidence_strength mixed
newest_evidence 2015
generated by process:wiki-ingest on 2026-10-16
trust unverified — no one has confirmed this page's content
sources 1 — alexander-koch-2015

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