Intentional binding links voluntary actions to their outcomes in subjective time, creating experience of agency and responsibility¶
Claim · All claims
Evidence · 1 study · reviewr2·q2
Currency · newest study 2012 · not yet checked against its sources · not reviewed by a person
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q2 i? Actions and their consequences are experienced as closer together in subjective time than objective time, but only for voluntary actions. → Frith Chris D 2012
Evidence¶
Frith Chris D 2012¶
Frith Chris D. (2012). The role of metacognition in human social interactions. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2012.0123
q2 · i? · review · r2
The review reports Haggard et al.'s finding (as cited) that voluntary actions show intentional binding, an compression of subjective interval between action and outcome, absent for involuntary actions. The review links this to experience of agency and sense of responsibility.
"actions and their consequences are experienced as closer together in subjective time than in objective time. Such intentional binding does not occur when the action is involuntary"
Discussion¶
Related Claims¶
Page metadata
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
type |
claim |
id |
intentional-binding-agency-responsibility |
title |
Intentional binding links voluntary actions to their outcomes in subjective time, creating experience of agency and responsibility |
description |
Intentional binding links voluntary actions to their outcomes in subjective time, creating experience of agency and responsibility |
status |
review |
evidence_strength |
moderate |
newest_evidence |
2012 |
generated |
by process:wiki-ingest on 2026-10-17 |
trust |
unverified — no one has confirmed this page's content |
sources |
1 — frith-chris-d-2012 |
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