Offer selective financial transfer incentives to staff hard-to-staff schools with high-performing teachers¶

Strategy · All strategies
Evidence · 1 claim (1 mixed) · 1 study (1 causal), q2 · 0 of 1 report an effect size · 1 claim rests on one study

Description¶

A district staffing strategy in which high-performing teachers are offered a large one-time payment — here $20,000 — to transfer into the district's hardest-to-staff schools. The article examines teachers' behavioral responses to such an offer across 10 school districts, framing the incentive as a tool for staffing low-performing schools.

Design Implications¶

Context¶

Requirements¶

• A mechanism for identifying high-performing teachers eligible for the offer
• Identification of the hardest-to-staff schools within the district
• Sufficient funding for the $20,000 transfer payment

Constraints¶

• Evidence in the article covers 10 school districts; behavioral responses were the studied outcome rather than guaranteed staffing gains

Target Learners¶

• Students in hard-to-staff, low-performing schools

Target Learning Goals¶

• Equitable access to high-performing teachers

Claims¶

• The paper examines high-performing teachers' willingness to transfer and the transfer offer's effect on receiving schools' internal dynamics [~W]

Related Strategies¶

• Use transfer incentives to place high-performing teachers in hard-to-staff schools serving disadvantaged students

Examples¶

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Key Sources¶

• Ali Protik, Steven Glazerman, Julie Bruch, Bing-ru Teh. (2015). Staffing a Low-Performing School: Behavioral Responses to Selective Teacher Transfer Incentives. Education Finance and Policy, vol. 10, no. 4. https://www.mathematica.org/publications/journal-article-staffing-a-lowperforming-school-behavioral-responses-to-selective