Sanction threats on low-performing schools can raise student test scores in the short run, but the role of gaming behavior versus genuine reform has been uncertain¶

Claim · All claims
Evidence · 1 study (2 entries) · causal r? · q3
Currency · newest study 2009 · not yet checked against its sources · not reviewed by a person

Subclaims¶

q3 i? The threat of sanctions on low-performing schools can raise student test scores in the short run. → Hanley Chiang 2009 q3 i? Before this study, the extent to which short-run test score improvements were due to schools' manipulation of the accountability system remained uncertain. → Hanley Chiang 2009 (2)

Evidence¶

Hanley Chiang 2009¶

Hanley Chiang. (2009). How Accountability Pressure on Failing Schools Affects Student Achievement. Journal of Public Economics, vol. 93, issue 9-10. https://www.mathematica.org/publications/how-accountability-pressure-on-failing-schools-affects-student-achievement

q3 · i? · causal · r?

The article states as background that "the threat of sanctions on low-performing schools can raise student test scores in the short run" while noting uncertainty about whether gains reflect "schools' manipulation of the accountability system." No effect size is printed.

"Although the threat of sanctions on low-performing schools can raise student test scores in the short run, the extent to which these test score improvements are due to schools' manipulation of the accountability system has remained uncertain."

Hanley Chiang 2009 (2)¶

Hanley Chiang. (2009). How Accountability Pressure on Failing Schools Affects Student Achievement. Journal of Public Economics, vol. 93, issue 9-10. https://www.mathematica.org/publications/how-accountability-pressure-on-failing-schools-affects-student-achievement

q3 · i? · causal · r?

The same background statement notes that "the extent to which these test score improvements are due to schools' manipulation of the accountability system has remained uncertain." No effect size is printed.

"Although the threat of sanctions on low-performing schools can raise student test scores in the short run, the extent to which these test score improvements are due to schools' manipulation of the accountability system has remained uncertain."

Discussion¶

Related Claims¶

• The study evaluates the relative importance of educational reforms and gaming behavior in generating test score gains by threatened schools — related
• Threat-induced math improvements from attending a threatened elementary school persist at least through the first one to two years of middle school — a narrower finding that bears on this claim
• Evidence for persistence of threat-induced reading improvements is less consistent than for math — related
• Sanction threats tend to raise school spending on instructional technology, curricular development, and teacher training — related
• Reformed elementary schools made significant test-score improvements versus matched comparison schools, with gains growing gradually over four years — related
• Low examinee effort is a major threat to valid uses of many test scores — related
• Single composite accountability indicators are susceptible to gaming and Campbell's Law corruption pressures — related
• Accountability sanction effects were not consistent across years and outcomes — related