Chicago principal merit award program¶

Element · All elements
Evidence · 2 claims (1 for, 1 mixed) · 2 studies (2 causal), q2–q3 · 0 of 2 report an effect size · 1 claim rests on one study

Description¶

A merit award program in which employers (the district) provide awards to school principals to induce greater effort. The program used an award threshold, allowing regression discontinuity comparison of principals who just exceeded versus fell just short of it. The article reports that "the award program incentives increased achievement," while award winners exited their schools at elevated rates the following year.

Design Implications¶

Context¶

Requirements¶

• An effectiveness threshold determining award receipt

Constraints¶

• Evaluated in the Chicago principal context using regression discontinuity and difference-in-differences methods

Target Learners¶

• school principals

Target Learning Goals¶

• inducing greater effort and productivity among school leaders

Claims¶

• Principals who just exceeded a merit award threshold are over twice as likely to exit their school the next year than principals who fell just short [~W] — (also cited [-W])
• The merit award program produced modest achievement improvements concentrated in schools close to the award threshold [+W]

Related Elements¶

Examples¶

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Key Sources¶

• Signaling effects of merit awards: Evidence from school principals in Chicago. (2023). Economics of Education Review. https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/economics-of-education-review