Demonstrated interest: applicant contacts with admissions offices as signals of enrollment probability¶

Theory · All theories
Evidence · 3 claims (3 for) · 1 study (1 associational), q2 · 0 of 1 report an effect size · 3 claims rest on one study

Description¶

The article frames applicants' contacts with admissions offices, such as campus visits, as signals that admissions officers read as interest in enrolling. Because colleges pursuing selectivity and class quality care whether high-quality applicants accept offers, the article states that "applicants' contacts with admissions offices, such as campus visits, can be viewed positively by the officers as demonstrated interest in the colleges." This signaling account motivates the empirical analysis of contact behavior and admission outcomes.

Design Implications¶

Context¶

Requirements¶

• Admissions offices must observe and record applicant contacts such as campus visits for the signal to enter admission decisions

Constraints¶

• The framework is motivated in a college-admissions setting with high-quality applicants who receive multiple competing offers

Target Learners¶

• College applicants to selective universities

Target Learning Objectives¶

• College access and admission outcomes for applicants

Claims¶

• Applicant Contact Increases Admission Probability [+M]
• Contact Effect Increasing In Sat Score [+M]
• A numerical example explores subsidizing low-income students' costly demonstrated interest to reduce admission inequity [+W]

Related Theories¶

Examples¶

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Key Sources¶

• James A. Dearden, Suhui Li, Chad D. Meyerhoefer, Muzhe Yang. (2017). Demonstrated Interest: Signaling Behavior in College Admissions. Contemporary Economic Policy, vol. 35, issue 4. https://www.mathematica.org/publications/demonstrated-interest-signaling-behavior-in-college-admissions