Naive science ideas are extremely persistent and probably never disappear even after extensive training such as a Ph.D. in physics, so conceptual change as replacement may never truly be achieved¶
Claim · All claims
Evidence · 1 study (2 entries) · causalr1·q1–q3
Currency · newest study 2021 · not yet checked against its sources · not reviewed by a person
Subclaims¶
Reading the evidence codes
q is the design tier, i the impact, n the sample, and the kind with its r
the rigour judged within that kind: what each code means.
This claim: no standardized effect is recorded in observations/ for it yet, so no benchmark reading is possible.
q3 i? The authors conclude that some naive ideas are extremely persistent, and probably never disappear, even after extensive training such as a Ph.D. in physics. → Geneviève Allaire-Duquette 2021
q3 i? The results suggest conceptual change as replacement of naive ideas by scientific ones might never truly be achieved; instead multiple ideas must be coordinated. → Geneviève Allaire-Duquette 2021 (2)
Evidence¶
Geneviève Allaire-Duquette 2021¶
Geneviève Allaire-Duquette, Lorie-Marlène Brault Foisy, Patrice Potvin, Martin Riopel, Marilyne Larose, Steve Masson. (2021). An fMRI study of scientists with a Ph.D. in physics confronted with naive ideas in science. npj Science of Learning 6:11. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41539-021-00091-x
q3 · i? · causal · r1
Authors' summary conclusion in the discussion, based on the behavioral interference effects and frontal inhibitory activations observed in the 25-participant fMRI study; naive ideas may persist because they are "based on deeply anchored intuitions or heuristics".
"Taken together, these results suggest that some naive ideas are extremely persistent, and probably never disappear, even after an extensive training, such as a Ph.D. in physics."
Geneviève Allaire-Duquette 2021 (2)¶
Geneviève Allaire-Duquette, Lorie-Marlène Brault Foisy, Patrice Potvin, Martin Riopel, Marilyne Larose, Steve Masson. (2021). An fMRI study of scientists with a Ph.D. in physics confronted with naive ideas in science. npj Science of Learning 6:11. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41539-021-00091-x
q1 · i? · causal · r1
Authors' theoretical interpretation in the discussion, drawn from the finding that even advanced experts must inhibit naive ideas; it is a perspective proposed, not a result tested in this study.
"These results evidence a perspective according to which naive ideas of science are unlikely to be replaced by scienti fic ones and that, in the long run, conceptual change as it was initially described (a replacement of naive ideas with scienti fic ones) might never truly be achieved."
Discussion¶
Related Claims¶
- When physicists with a Ph.D. confront naive ideas in their domain of expertise, MFG and IFG associated with inhibitory control are significantly more activated by incongruent than congruent statements — related
- Scientists with a Ph.D. in physics are less accurate when judging the scientific value of incongruent statements that trigger naive ideas than matched congruent statements, in both physics and biology — related
- When physicists with a Ph.D. judge incongruent statements in biology, where they hold basic expertise, activation overlaps with inhibitory-control regions including left IFG, ACC, insula and superior frontal gyrus — related
- Judging incongruent statements that trigger naive ideas recruits left IFG, bilateral superior frontal gyrus and bilateral ACC more than judging matched congruent statements — a broader claim this one bears on
- Physicists with a Ph.D. are slightly more accurate judging physics statements than biology statements (d = 0.5) — related
- Scientists with a Ph.D. in physics respond more slowly to incongruent statements than to matched congruent statements, with a response-time increase in physics twice as large as in biology — related
- An EXPERTISE × CONGRUENCY interaction in bilateral dorsal ACC shows the congruency effect on BOLD signal is larger for statements in biology, where participants hold basic expertise, than in physics — related
- Instruction that confronts science misconceptions (conceptual-conflict interventions, refutation text) produces conceptual change more often than standard exposition — related
- Alternative conceptions persist alongside scientific conceptions and resist change even after instruction — possibly the same claim (merge candidate)
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