The transfer incentive targeted high-performing teachers into the hardest-to-staff schools within their own districts¶
Claim · All claims
Evidence · 1 study · causalr?·q2
Currency · newest study 2015 · not yet checked against its sources · not reviewed by a person
Subclaims¶
Reading the evidence codes
q is the design tier, i the impact, n the sample, and the kind with its r
the rigour judged within that kind: what each code means.
This claim: no standardized effect is recorded in observations/ for it yet, so no benchmark reading is possible.
q2 i? The incentive program was selective on teacher performance and targeted transfers into the hardest-to-staff schools in the same districts. → Ali Protik 2015
Evidence¶
Ali Protik 2015¶
Ali Protik, Steven Glazerman, Julie Bruch, Bing-ru Teh. (2015). Staffing a Low-Performing School: Behavioral Responses to Selective Teacher Transfer Incentives. Education Finance and Policy, vol. 10, no. 4. https://www.mathematica.org/publications/journal-article-staffing-a-lowperforming-school-behavioral-responses-to-selective doi:10.1162/edfp_a_00174
q2 · i? · causal · r?
The program design, as described in the article, offered $20,000 to "high-performing teachers" to transfer into "the hardest-to-staff schools in those districts," making selectivity and within-district targeting defining features of the intervention.
"an incentive program that offers high-performing teachers in 10 school districts across the country $20,000 to transfer into the hardest-to-staff schools in those districts."
Discussion¶
Related Claims¶
- A study of a $20,000 selective transfer incentive examined high-performing teachers' behavioral responses in 10 districts — possibly the same claim (merge candidate)
- A $20,000 selective transfer incentive offers high-performing teachers in 10 districts payment to move into their district's hardest-to-staff schools — possibly the same claim (merge candidate)
- The paper examines high-performing teachers' willingness to transfer and the transfer offer's effect on receiving schools' internal dynamics — related
- Offering $20,000 per teacher filled 90 percent of targeted vacancies in hard-to-staff schools with high-performing teachers across seven districts — related
- Most TTI teachers stayed on the job even after incentive payments ended — related
- Most TTI teachers stayed on the job even after transfer payments ended — related
- TTI was more cost-effective than similar teacher-transfer incentive interventions — related
Page metadata
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
type |
claim |
id |
selective-transfer-targets-hardest-to-staff-schools |
title |
The transfer incentive targeted high-performing teachers into the hardest-to-staff schools within their own districts |
description |
The transfer incentive targeted high-performing teachers into the hardest-to-staff schools within their own districts |
status |
review |
evidence_strength |
weak |
newest_evidence |
2015 |
generated |
by process:wiki-ingest on 2026-10-08 |
trust |
unverified — no one has confirmed this page's content |
sources |
1 — ali-protik-2015 |
Frontmatter is the page's machine-readable record — see the Schema & Guide.