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Epistemic Injustice

Theory · All theories
Evidence · 2 claims (2 for) · 2 studies (1 qualitative, 1 theoretical), q1–q2 · 0 of 2 report an effect size · 2 claims rest on one study

Description

Epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007) names two specific ways people can be wronged in their capacity as knowers, not just materially or socially. Testimonial injustice occurs when a hearer, influenced by prejudice tied to a speaker's social identity, gives that speaker's testimony less credibility than it deserves. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when a gap in society's shared interpretive resources — concepts, vocabulary, frameworks — leaves a group unable to make sense of, or communicate, a significant area of their own social experience, often because that group has been excluded from the practices that produce those interpretive resources in the first place. Applied to instructional and knowledge-building contexts, the framework reframes minoritized learners' first-hand, embodied, and community experience not as anecdote to be set aside once "real" data or "real" science enters the room, but as a legitimate epistemic resource — a form of evidence that dominant scientific and institutional data can miss or actively suppress, especially during a fast-moving crisis where official data is incomplete, delayed, or produced in a language or format a community cannot access.

Implications

Context

  • Most relevant in real-time, high-uncertainty socio-scientific contexts (e.g., a public health crisis) where official/institutional data is incomplete, delayed, or inaccessible to a minoritized community, leaving members to reason partly from direct, embodied experience
  • Applies wherever a design or institution risks treating a marginalized group's lived testimony as less credible than official/scientific data, rather than as complementary evidence

Target Learners

  • Minoritized and marginalized learners whose communities' knowledge, language, or lived experience is often excluded from dominant scientific or institutional discourse

Target Learning Objectives

  • Building socio-scientific decision-making capacity that legitimately integrates personal/community lived experience alongside scientific and institutional data, rather than subordinating the former to the latter

Claims

  • Onto-Epistemic Heterogeneity — both treat marginalized learners' lived experience as a constitutive epistemic resource rather than supplementary; onto-epistemic heterogeneity focuses on disciplinary learning generally, while epistemic injustice specifically names the credibility and interpretive-resource harms that occur when that experience is dismissed
  • Funds of Knowledge — shares the commitment to treating household/community knowledge as a legitimate resource, though funds of knowledge is more operational (specific elicitable practices) while epistemic injustice names the harm of not doing so
  • Cultural-Historical Activity Theory — both attend to whose knowledge counts and how institutional or dominant framings can narrow or suppress other participants' meaning-making
  • Womanist Restorying — both reframe a marginalized group's own account of their experience as a legitimate resource rather than something to be corrected by a dominant narrative; restorying additionally offers a concrete narrative-reconstruction method
  • Foucauldian power/knowledge and episteme framework for situating Indigenous knowledges within Western universities

Examples

Key Sources

  • Sedawi, W., & Calabrese Barton, A. (2024). Toward epistemic justice in socio-scientific decision-making: How youth make sense of lively COVID-19 and vaccines data. Journal of the Learning Sciences, 33(4-5), 667-718. https://doi.org/10.1080/10508406.2024.2381205
  • Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press.
  • Lupton, D. (2018). Vital materialism and the thing-power of lively digital data. In J. Ash, R. Kitchin, & A. Leszczynski (Eds.), Digital Geographies (pp. 3-16). Sage.
Page metadata
Field Value
type theory
title Epistemic Injustice
description Epistemic injustice describes wrongs done to people specifically in their capacity as knowers — through testimonial injustice (unwarranted credibility discounting) or hermeneutical injustice (a gap in shared interpretive resources) — and reframes marginalized people's lived experience as a legitimate epistemic resource rather than a deficit.
status review
canonical True
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sources 1 — sedawi-calabrese-barton-2024

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